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ABSTRACT:
In his article “Will to Language, Culture, and Power” Gábor Vaderna investigates 
different discourses of violence in early 19th-century Hungary. According to Norbert 
Elias, violence has not disappeared from modern society but the individual has trans-
ferred the institution, opportunity, and protocols of violence to the state. There are 
also aesthetic consequences of this process. The question is whether institutional-
ized violence was a tool of power to stabilize modern societies or rather it was in 
fact a threat to aesthetic beauty. From the analysis of a poem by the Hungarian 
poet, Dániel Berzsenyi (1776–1832), written in wartime, Vaderna concludes that the 
Central European noble classes perceived a tension between the eternal virtue and 
real history. The exercise of power, the possession of violence and the nation-building 
potential of culture were closely intertwined in their political language.
Keywords: martial poetry, violence, civilizing process, aesthetics of power, 
insurrection
(taming violence)
Steven Pinker’s scientific bestseller, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The 
Decline of Violence in History and its Causes was published in 2011. The 
author, a cognitive psychologist, located “better angels” mainly in the 
individual. These are empathy, self-control, moral sense, and reason – 
all buzzwords of the age of the Enlightenment. However, Pinker as-
serted much more than what Norbert Elias had said before. As it is 
well-known, Elias captured the process of civilization in the increasing 
control over affect (and thus over violence). For him, external pressures 




were replaced by forms of self-regulation, resulting in the creation of 
modern states possessing the monopoly of violence. In Elias’ analy-
sis, violence has not disappeared from society, but the individual has 
transferred the institution, opportunity, and protocols of violence to the 
state (Elias, The Civilizing Process; cf. Esser, “Figurationssoziologie…”). 
Pinker is much more optimistic: according to him, there is a decreasing 
amount of violence in the life of modern mankind, and in general, the 
project of the Enlightenment has not finished yet, although there have 
been deflections acting as a counterforce, such as great wars or geno-
cides. According to Pinker, we may perceive that there is more violence 
around us, because our communication is increasingly advanced, and 
we talk more about the topic (which is actually a proof of decreasing 
violence). Whether modernity has created increasingly sophisticated 
forms of violence (as Michel Foucault and his followers think, for ex-
ample) or violence is increasingly foregrounded in discourse because it 
is crowded out from more and more areas in modern societies, I will 
not decide here (cf. Macfarlane, Harrison, The Justice and the Mare’s Ale; 
Stone, “Interpersonal Violence in English Society, 1300–1980”; Sharpe, 
“The History of Violence in England. Some Observations”; Stone, “The 
History of Violence in England. Some Observations. A Rejoinder”). In 
any case, the interpretation of the data listed by Pinker and the all-en-
lightening “facts” have by no means been settled.
A potentially more important circumstance for us is that both Elias, 
whose theory of civilization is still debated today, and Pinker, who pos-
es as the present-day apostle of positive social utopias, presumed a direct 
relationship between the individual and society: although the two are of 
course not completely the same for them due to their mutually hypoth-
esized nature, they also function as mirrors for each other. They both 
roam the field of social psychology, where the individual’s behavioral 
patterns come together in social formations. (In this respect, the only 
difference between the two authors is that Pinker has radicalized Elias’ 
descriptive theory.) Elias claims that civilization is nothing but a sum 
of systems of behavior and gestures, and thus it does not equal culture 
itself. The “culture” of a society may include many different behavioral 
patterns (for example, at the beginning of nineteenth century, public 
executions were held in even peaceful times in Europe); however, in 
order for civilization to develop, the individual’s stoic self-restraint 
is necessary. At the same time, aggression does not disappear in the 
process of civilization, according to Elias, instead, its physical practices 
are replaced by gestures and symbols (Elias, “An Essay on Sport and 
Violence”).
Based on the above, it is not surprising that the literature on Elias 
has mostly researched the heterogenous Freudian roots of the theory 
(Linklater, Mennell, “Norbert Elias, the Civilizing Process”; Grubner, 
“Kultureller Narzissmus”). However, if we look at the period under ob-
servation, i.e. early modernity, interesting parallels also appear between 
Elias’ theory and the self-descriptions of the period. Lisa Hill has taken 
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this the furthest by seeing a direct relationship between the early mod-
ern reception of ancient philosophy, especially by Adam Ferguson, and 
modern sociology, i.e. Georg Simmel, Norbert Elias, Lewis A. Coser, 
Max Weber, and Karl Marx (“Eighteenth-Century Anticipations of the 
Sociology of Conflict”). In any case, this warrants the consideration 
that the self-restraint of pre-modern men can be equally derived from 
the Stoic ideal of the “public man” (i.e. from the ancient traditions – cf. 
Sennett, The Fall of Public Man) and from the spread of the bourgeois 
family model. However, this is only seemingly a paradox: there is a sim-
ilar vision of history behind the heuristic civilizing narrative of Scottish 
Enlightenment and the observations of the cognitive psychologist of 
the modern era. Accordingly, history is a kind of progress from barba-
rism towards culturalism (whatever culturalism may mean today), from 
hunting-gathering through shepherding and agricultural social forms 
to commercial bourgeois societies (whatever bourgeois may mean here 
– Brewer, “Adam Ferguson and the Theme of Exploitation”). Where 
Elias still diverts from the civilizing model of Scottish Enlightenment 
is the separation of culture and civilization: in this sense, Elias is not a 
successor of enlightenment any more.
In the debate which had been going on at least since the Berlinische 
Monatschrift posed the renowned question in 1784, i.e. “was ist 
Aufklärung?”, “what is enlightenment?”, the processes of intellectual 
history tagged as enlightenment also contained indirect and direct 
statements on the issue of violence. In Central and Eastern Europe 
from the outset, and in the West at least from the French revolution on, 
the issue of violence became a key point of Enlightenment in that on 
the one hand, enlightenment is undoubtedly “man’s emergence from his 
self-imposed nonage”, as Kant put it (Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”; 
the original: Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” 
481); it was as a result of this that everything based on the assumption of 
authority or pure faith was ridiculed; thus, several proponents of enlight-
enment thought that the predestination of authority positions should be 
replaced by authority based on merit. On the other hand, replacing the 
outdated pre-modern thought patterns also meant the transformation 
of the structure of power. It was obvious in the debates on reason and 
science that new authority was also accompanied by new power, even if 
it had a different structure than the power structures of the earlier rep-
resentative public sphere. We could also summarize the paradox of this 
duality by saying that the proponents of liberty and equality could only 
liberate themselves and their fellow men through violence. Notice how 
neutral Kant’s definition cited above is: “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang 
des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit.” Man had 
self-imposed the previous darkness, from which he somehow emerges. 
However, Kant spends fewer words on practical implementation: if all 
goes well, our emergence from immaturity will happen automatically. 
What this speech avoids and hides is that the road to freedom is paved 
with the everyday practices of violence (Reemtsma, Vertrauen und Gewalt 
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532–537). (All this emerged in the Eastern part of Europe poignantly: 
while enlightened-absolutist rulers boasted their erudition for all to see, 
they built a centralized state that wanted to rule over its subjects rather 
than liberate them. As Ernest Gellner remarked ironically about the 
transformation of ideas into concrete political action: „There is the rub: 
how do you modernize your army without producing Decembrits?” see 
“The Struggle to Catch Up” 14.)
The debate escalated around modern forms of violence when the 
French revolution transplanted the indirect, discursive forms of violence 
into practice. The result is well-known; the shock of European philoso-
phes was widespread. Edmund Burke’s graphically depicted scenes are 
well-known, where a band of cruel ruffians and assassins rush into the 
almost naked queen’s chamber, pierce the bed with a hundred strokes 
of bayonets and poniards, and the royal family has to suffer through 
assorted humiliations. Burke does not hesitate to make a direct connec-
tion between brute force and philosophical reasoning:
On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy, which 
is the offspring of cold hearts and muddy under-
standings, and which is as void of solid wisdom as 
it is destitute of all taste and elegance, laws are to be 
sup-ported only by their own terrors and by the con-
cern which each individual may find in them from his 
own private speculations or can spare to them from 
his own private interests. In the groves of their acade-
my, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but the 
gallows. (Reflections on The Revolution in France 64.)
In fact, this is when violence became one of the big questions of 
self-awareness of modernity on the one hand (can we constrain vio-
lence? do all intentions to improve society inevitably end in aggression? 
how do the sophisticated forms of violence undermine the illusion of 
containing violence?); on the other, Burke also touches upon the aes-
thetic dimension of violence: namely the sight of a scantily clad queen 
fleeing brings up the question of the relationship between beauty and 
ugliness. Burke distils the queen almost into an allegory of beauty (“It 
is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the Queen of France, then 
the dauphiness, at Versailles, and surely never lighted on this orb, which 
she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision.” Ibid. 63.), and 
when this beauty is dredged out of her bed, it is actually the disgusting, 
the hideous, the ugly that overcomes her. Yet being overcome is not 
a struggle between equals: brute force defeats refinement. Of course, 
Burke was later often criticized for the pathetic scene (since he himself 
could not have been there) and its evaluation (the figure of hyperbole 
is almost a parody of itself). However, the significance of the fact that 
in his reflections on the French revolution, Burke saw and depicted 
philosophical, aesthetic, and ethical dimensions together, and he did 
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so by floating the threat of violence both in the scenes depicted, the 
political- philosophical problems he raised, and the method and rhet-
oric of the depiction is undeniable (Furniss, Edmund Burke’s Aesthetic 
Ideology 138–163).
(coalition wars and the Kingdom of Hungary)
Hungarian soldiers fought in the coalition wars against the French from 
the outset in 1792 as part of the imperial and royal army. Beyond this, 
more substantial Hungarian armed forces were mustered four times 
(1797, 1800, 1805, 1809). Article 1741:63. regulated the legal conditions 
of this. Accordingly, it is the ruler who could muster the noble uprising 
and insurrectionist forces, but only if the imperial armed forces cannot 
hold the enemy back and the country is in direct danger. This is why the 
institution of insurrection fundamentally served self-defense purposes, 
and it was surrounded by the odium of protecting the homeland. It is not 
difficult to see that in the age of mass armed forces, an untrained army 
recruited from noblemen could have been quite outdated. This may be 
one of the reasons why in the contemporary reception of insurrection, 
the role of individual virtue gained serious importance, as did empha-
sizing the fact that patriotic enthusiasm may be what can overcome the 
enemy (Kecskeméti, La Hongrie et le reformisme liberal 271–292).
Insurrections later gained a bad reputation: in the end, the Hungarian 
troops could not really demonstrate any victories, although Hungarian 
noble banderia also participated in the united troops of the Monarchy 
– thus both the successes and the even more numerous failures, as well 
as the ultimate victory was shared with the imperial army (Wertheimer, 
Ausztria és Magyarország… passim.; Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 
226–230; Judson, The Habsburg Empire 89–102). The notoriety of 
Hungarians’ military performance was mostly due to the connections 
between the last big noble uprising and the lost battle of Győr/Raab 
(14 June, 1809). The quick depreciation of the heroism of the wars 
against the French is due to three different circumstances. First, be-
yond heroism/valor, money also depreciated. While the shock caused 
by the states of war that followed each other in waves could not be con-
trolled, the country’s economy also faced a significant crisis. This also 
put the losses due to the state of war in a somewhat different perspec-
tive (Mérei, “Magyarország gazdasága…”). Second, while the political 
structure proved to be enduring (H. Balázs, “La noblesse hongorise et 
les Lumières”; Szijártó, “The Unexpected Survival of the Dualism of 
King and Estates”), the method of organizing military troops that had 
seemed to be working during the French wars was finished for good 
by the second decade of the nineteenth century. Thus, it might have 
seemed as if the military failure had also provoked the reorganization 
of the army. What is more, it may have turned the outdated image 
of the noble uprising into a cornerstone of the political identity of the 
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following political generation: this is how the defeat at Győr/Raab could 
have become a symbol (or parody) of the political problem of conserva-
tism. Finally, from the four uprisings the first three dissolved without 
any military events. The defeat of the fourth uprising could also have 
seemed bigger in retrospect, because it had been preceded by increasing 
anticipation.
However, it is also a significant fact that in terms of the politics of 
memory, the French wars and the participation of the Hungarian noble 
armed forces constituted a kind of turning point for the contempo-
raries. In other words, for them, participation in the wars against the 
French somehow became an event, and they also wished to immortalize 
its characteristics as an event. Never before had so many poems, pam-
phlets, articles, and news items circulated around a single topic at the 
same time as in then. This memory boom meant the simultaneous ap-
plication of several cultural techniques, what is more, these techniques 
were quite new – and even if the historical agents used gestures of the 
politics of memory known from earlier times, they produced them in a 
format renewed in terms of technique, content, or medium (cf. Császár, 
“Az  utolsó nemesi felkelés az irodalomban”). A  spectacular example 
among these gestures was the affair of the monument erected in mem-
ory of the fallen heros of Zemplén county. Not only because well-known 
historical figures developed the design, i.e. politician count József 
Dessewffy and writer Ferenc Kazinczy, but also because the complet-
ed product (a carved column with inscriptions) can also be interpreted 
as a proposal for the localization of a type of monument that had not 
been present in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary (Dessewffy, 
Kazinczy, Vélemények).
But what was the cause of this memory boom? It had partly historical 
and partly media-related reasons – more specifically, the coincidence 
of these generated the never before seen glut of gestures in the poli-
tics of memory. This was the era after the politically frustrated peri-
od of Joseph II, when the reparation of the relationship between the 
Hungarian noble estates and the king was at stake. The ruler needed 
the help of the Hungarian estates (he needed to convince them about 
taxes and conscription), while the Hungarian estates received an op-
portunity to repair their battered national self-esteem. Thus, settling 
the Hungarians’ position within the empire could resurface after 1790 
(Balázs, “Absolutisme éclairé – noblesse éclairée”; ibid., “Joseph II et 
la Hongrie”). What is more, the developments in France were just 
as shocking for the Hungarian estates as they were in other parts of 
Europe. The fear of revolt on the part of the ruler and the estates was 
a common point which strengthened the aulic characteristics of noble 
patriotism during these decades. (It also may be no coincidence what 
an astonishing cult of an enlightened absolutist Napoleon emerged in 
Central Europe after his ascendancy. Not only did it speak to the myth 
of the invincible general, but it also symbolized a possible route to over-
coming fear. For the cult of Napoleon see Hughes, “Clothing the New 
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Emperor”; for the cult of Napoleon in Hungary see Kosáry, Napoleon 
et la Hongrie.) It was in this historical environment that the new media 
conditions could be exploited as efficiently as possible. The 1790s saw 
one of the biggest upswings in Hungarian pamphlet literature – these 
mostly debated political positions, although many other questions could 
also be raised. During this period, many different media products were 
launched – some of which expressly took on reporting on military news, 
so information about the war arrived every day in an unprecedented way 
(Vaderna, “Language, Media and Politics in the Hungarian Kingdom 
between 1770 and 1820”). Finally, the boom in printing opened up to 
new forms of exhortation. Masses of insurrectionist songs were created 
during this time (or previous songs were transformed for this purpose), 
and a significant proportion of these was also printed. Besides the 
masses of anonymous poets, more and less renowned names cropped 
up as well. Of course, all this is a rather multifaceted discoursive space 
divided into several subcultures, and the opinions voiced and the social 
practices used here do not necessarily point in the same direction.
(a Hungarian poet in wartime)
Dániel Berzsenyi (1776–1836) lived in the Western counties of the 
Kingdom of Hungary during the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
and that is where he wrote his poems. He only published his monu-
mental odes containing lofty images and hyperboles and conveying ma-
jestic aesthetic experience decades later, in 1813; however, these poems 
reveal much about the poetic representation of war and violence. He 
also wrote some poems about the insurrection, and he steadily produced 
texts during the coalition wars. War might have been his everyday ex-
perience: troops marched across his estates; at first, he could sell his crop 
at a good price, but later his money depreciated. His martial poems are 
pervaded by the pride of patriotism: he saw the following of the ancient 
constitution in the tradition of the noble uprising, which ensures the 
freedom of the country. (Of course, he identified the country with the 
noble estates.) There was a war and Berzsenyi, although with his own 
paradoxes, reacted to the big debates of his era on violence. The model 
of development for culture and civilization was very important for him; 
however, he did not apply a neat version of politeness to the Hungarian 
situation, but, as it so often happened in Central Europe, he combined 
it with other types of political language (the language of the ancient 
constitution or republicanism). He addressed the aspects of violence 
that destroyed culture on multiple occasions, although as a good patriot 
he also supported protecting the homeland, acquired through blood, 
by means of further sacrifices. Of course, for him culture also meant 
gaining, building, and ruling the monopoly of violence – which would 
sound strange in other places, but this is a completely legitimate posi-
tion in this region. With him, this did not contradict the aristocratic 
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models of spreading culture. Finally, the power of Berzsenyi’s poetic 
language (or in another, more critical approach: its excessive pathos) is 
often mentioned. For him, language was not the territory of violence in 
the sense of aggression; at the same time, the performative potential of 
his rhetoric made it possible to dominate discussions, and so it did have 
something to do with violence.
In the following, one example will be examined to show how 
Berzsenyi pictured the relationship between violence and culture.
(mythology, history, event)
At the beginning of 1797, the French troops made substantial advanc-
es, which also made it possible to attack Vienna. Francis I called the 
Hungarian noble uprising to arms on 8 April, 1797. The estates of Vas 
county gathered on 15 April, 1797 under the open sky, in the court of 
the Szombathely episcopal palace, to discuss the consequences of the 
state of war. They decided to arm the banderium, which consisted of 
2,000 infantrymen and 1,000 horsemen (Magyar Hírmondó 11.31 [18 
April, 1797]: 470–471). On 2 May, the horsemen were already gather-
ing in Szombathely, for the time being under the leadership of lord-lieu-
tenant prince Lajos Batthyány (Magyar Hírmondó 11.37 [9 May, 1797]: 
556.). Prince Miklós Esterházy was still in Pápa in June and oversaw 
the gathering of the banderia of Veszprém county (Magyar Hírmondó 
11.47 [13 June, 1797]: 556.). By the end of August the different banderia 
united around Szombathely. We can read about the parade of the coun-
ty troops in the Magyar Hírmondó [Hungarian Herald] newspaper in 
detail. The anonymous correspondent commented on what he saw the 
following way: “In light of their upstanding behavior, prince Esterházy, 
their district general, issued ten kreuzer from his own to every private 
and twenty kreuzer to every junior officer, so they can have fun. His 
Highness the Prince encouraged the Veszprém infantry troops in the 
same way for their good behavior, distributing the deserved reward in 
the form of money. Unless there is any obstacle, we will have a big 
maneuver again on the last day of August.” (Magyar Hírmondó 12.18 
[1 September, 1797]: 294.) The soldiers did need to be appeased with 
some payment, considering that the promised military operation was 
cancelled, and after some time spent waiting around, the troops were 
disappointed to be eventually disbanded. Of course, Berzsenyi’s odes 
knew nothing about this failure.
Berzsenyi wrote his ode for the occasion of the Szombathely en-
campment in 1797: Herceg Esterházy Miklóshoz (To Prince Nicolaus 
Esterházy). The stake of the ode is how to find language for lawful vio-
lence. To paraphrase the problem a little: how can you find a language 
for legitimizing violence (its deontological ethics) where some kind of 
linguistic violence forces the historical characters to commit violence for 
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the sake of the community? And does the order of discourse contain the 
deontological ethics of power and violence?
Let us first see the text. On the left side I present a modern transcrip-
tion of an 1808 manuscript copy of the poem, while on the right side I 
present a prose translation (Manuscript Collection of the Library of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Irod. Lev. 4r 44. sz. 119r–120r. 
The critical edition of the œuvre: Berzsenyi, Költői művei):
Herceg Eszterházÿ Mikloshoz. To Prince Nicolaus Esterházy
[1] Pannon legelső embere, támasza!
Elődeidnek fegyvere népeket
      Győzött, s hazánkért számtalanszor
 A viadal mezein csatázott.
Foremost man of Pannonia, her 
own support! The weapon of your 
ancestors destroyed peoples and it 
has fought for our homeland on the 
battlefield countless times.
[2] Ők voltak a harc vérzivatarjain
S a béke napjain bölcs vezetők, atyák,
     Kormányra termett őrszemekkel
 Szélveszeket zabolázva tartók.
They were the wise leaders and 
fathers on the days of rains of blood 
of battle and days of peace, who 
cast protective eyes on the helm and 
reined in the windstorms.
[3] Mely áldozat volt a vezekényi harc!
Bús tisztelettel könnyezi a magyar
     Négy bajnok Esterházy véres
 Porba kevert ajakit s halálát.
What sacrifice the Vezekény battle 
was! With sadness and respect, the 
Hungarians mourn the bloody lips of 
the four victorious Esterházys mixed 
in with the dirt and their death.
[4] Láttam te benned buzgani véröket
S orcádra öntött nemzeti lelköket,
     Láttam szemed villám sugárát
 S ősi dicső vasadat kezedben.
I saw their blood gush within you 
and their national spirit glisten on 
your face, I saw the lightning ray of 
your eye and your ancient glorious 
metal [your sword] in your hand.
[5] Rémülve megszűnt a fene háború;
Int a kegyetlen tengerek Istene
     Képével a forró haboknak,
 S eltűnik a Pelagus dagálya.
The ruthless war ended in a dreadful 
way; the God of the ferocious seas 
faces and beckons the hot waves, and 
the flood of Pelagus disappears.
[6] Szép a borostyán, s győzödelem szekér,
Szép a vitéznek sebhelye homlokán,
Félisten, akit nimbuszával
 A hatalom s tudomány ragyogtat.
The amber and the triumphal chariot 
are beautiful, the scar on the val-
iant’s forehead is beautiful – he is a 
demigod, whose glory is illuminated 
by power and art.
[7] Minden nagy és szép, melyet az óvilág
És e jelen kor mívei közt csudálsz,
     Héró, dicsősség, fényes ország,
 A tudomány gyönyörű gyümölcse.
All is great and beautiful that you 
admire among the creations of the 
ancient world and the present time, 
heros, glory, a rich country, the beau-
tiful fruit of art.
[8] Ez hozta Mennyből földre az isteni
Szikrát, ez oldott a butaság alól.
     A bölcs Athénát s győzhetetlen
 Róma fejét ez emelte égre.
This is what has brought the divine 
spark from Heaven down to Earth, 
this is what has saved us from folly. 
This is what has raised wise Athens 




[9] Nézd a virágzó Gallia népeit
S Nelson hazáját, – rettegi a világ
     Ez ész s erő két nagy csudájat,
 S hirdeti napkelet és enyészet.
Watch the peoples of thriving Gaul 
and Nelson’s homeland – the world 
fears these two big miracles of 
reason and power, and this is what 
the East/sunrise and the West/decay 
announces.
[10] Hát nemzetednek mért fakad oly soká
A rég ohajtott laurus? – ezer nemes
     Vállvetve törtet, s gátokat ront, 
 Ah, de acél hegyek állnak ellent.
Oh why does the long-desired laurus 
take so long to spring for your nation 
– a thousand noblemen push forward 
shoulder to shoulder, destroying all 
obstacles, but, alas, the steel moun-
tains resist.
[11] Téged, hatalmas herceg, az istenek
Fő polcra tettek, véreidet segéld,
     Vidd a dicsőség templomához:
 Ajtaja zára lehull előtted.
You, mighty prince, the gods have 
placed in the highest rank, help your 
flesh and blood, bring it to the tem-
ple of fame: the lock of its door will 
drop in front of you.
When we start reading the poem, we can find one of the best-known 
narratives of the historical self-identification of Hungarian nobility at 
the beginning:
Pannon legelső embere, támasza!
Elődeidnek fegyvere népeket
 Győzött.
[Foremost man of Pannonia, her own support! 
The weapon of your ancestors destroyed peoples.]
Here a reference is made to the historically continuous tradition of no-
blemen sacrificing their blood for their homeland as the direct descen-
dants of their settler ancestors. And this tradition obliges noblemen 
(in this case Esterházy): he has to conform to the tradition that sees 
the guarantee of a nation’s future in a stoic ethics that sacrifices the 
individual’s interests for the sake of the community. Of course, what 
kind of legacy the past puts on the present, as a kind of difficulty, is far 
from clear. Here Berzsenyi, in line with the classical perception of time 
in Hungarian patriotic poetry, places the glorious past and the losses 
of the past next to each other. Victory is mentioned first (first stanza), 
then the Esterházys appear as the keepers of peace (second stanza), 
and finally, the losses appear in a harmonic structure (third stanza). 
Meanwhile, the Esterházys also rise up when the wise leaders and fa-
thers rein in the windstorms. In this stanza, Berzsenyi refers to Boreas, 
the ancient northern wind: he took Orithyia, the beautiful daughter 
of king Erechtheus, because the king of Athens did not want to give 
her hand to him in marriage. One of the following kings of Athens, 
in order to placate Boreas, who was still seething later, built the tower 
of the winds in his honor. (The most widely known version of the sto-
ry: Ovid, Metamorphoses, 6,675–721. See also Pausanias, Description of 
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Greece, 5,19,1.). In this allegory, the wisdom leading to peace belongs to 
the Esterházys: they are the ones who can rein in the wild windstorms. 
So the historical example in the following stanza is also placed in the 
following mythological light: this is how the four Esterházys fallen in 
the battle of Vezekény become mythical figures themselves. (After the 
battle of Vezekény – today: Veľké Vozokany, Slovakia –, in 1652, the 
Esterházy family organized a spectacular representative funeral: this is 
how they expressed their loyalty to the Habsburgs and their family’s 
power among the Hungarian nobility.)
The “victorious battle – peace – lost battle” sequence may be an in-
nocent parallel, but it also may include the necessary progress of all 
historical peoples’ lives. It is about the organic metaphor that imagines 
the fate of the nation as a parallel of a person’s life, and it extends this 
narrative pattern to almost all more ambitious historical narratives. Of 
course, for this, Miklós Esterházy’s figure should also include this his-
tory, more specifically, the history of his family, and more broadly what 
the history of this family includes, i.e. the history of the nation. The four 
Esterházys who died a heroic death in the battle of Vezekény become 
the same as the Esterházy who is Berzsenyi’s contemporary, who will 
thus be obliged to follow his ancestors who took on martyrdom, even 
to their deaths.
The three life phases in the first three stanzas can also be read as 
potential mirrors of Miklós Esterházy’s fate. However, in the specific 
wartime situation which the title specifically locates in space and time, 
it is not the same at all which of the three possibilities will eventually 
prevail. The fourth stanza announces the interplay of the specific situ-
ation and the dimension of deontological ethics that is elevated to the 
mythological space: in this case “I saw” can both mean literally that 
Berzsenyi indeed saw Esterházy, but also how he manifested in the 
“national spirit” and “the lightning ray of your eye”; and the “ancient 
glorious metal” again both contains the historical agent appearing in 
the specific historical situation as well as the heros emerging from the 
mythology of the past. Concerning the latter, the historical agent’s task 
is to grow into the heros created (imagined) in the past. This growth 
is served by what can be called the violence of language. In the next 
few stanzas, Berzsenyi flashes a series of analogies in the philosophy 
of history, while it is unclear throughout if the “I saw” leading in the 
train of thought is a description of the specific situation (in which case 
Esterházy’s elevation is nothing but some kind of flattery) or if this “I 
saw” already signals the Neoplatonic exaltatio, a  transcending of the 
natural order that is only possible for the poet (in which case the follow-
ing are rather fantasies or visions).
The fifth stanza, which envisioned the end of the “ruthless war”, 
could both be a vision running into the future (the wars against the 
French will end sooner or later) and the narrative pattern of the myth-
ical tradition at the same time. Berzsenyi combined two mythological 
stories: a Greek and a Latin one, both only indirectly. He specifically 
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mentioned Pelagus. This name probably came to him in connection with 
the story of the flood of Deucalion: in the Greek myth, Zeus wanted to 
destroy the world with a flood because Lycaon, Pelagus’ son, had served 
him human meat for dinner (Pseudo-Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, 3,3,1; 
Pausainas, Description of Greece, VIII,2,1; the most widely known version 
– but Pelagus does not appear here: Ovid, Metamorphoses, 1,230–415). 
The other element of the story that Berzsenyi refers to is well-known: 
it comes from the beginning of Virgil’s Aeneid, where Neptune calms 
the frenzied waves, thus saving Aeneas’ life (Virgil, Aeneid, 1,125–156). 
However, this scene, stripped of its context, is left on its own to some 
extent: it is impossible to know if Esterházy is the same as Aeneas, 
who is adrift on the waves of the sea, looking for a new homeland, or 
if the calming of the sea only signals the beginning of a new, more 
peaceful period (and the Virgilian scene is only flashed as an aside). It is 
unclear if Aeneas-Esterházy is a founder of this better era (i.e. if Aeneas’ 
future, which the reader obviously knows, is implicit in the image) or 
if the new era will necessarily come (and Esterházy’s glorious military 
achievement, which he is yet to accomplish, will lead to it).
The following stanzas do not help decide the dilemma, either. 
Berzsenyi piles images on top of each other; however, the logical rela-
tionships between these images remain unclear. Beauty and greatness 
appear at the conceptual level, but we cannot find their definition. Thus, 
the amber, the triumphal chariot, the scar on the valiant’s forehead, the 
heros who is becoming a demigod, the victor, glory, a rich country, and 
the beautiful fruit of art are all beautiful and great. He actually only 
reveals that
Minden nagy és szép, melyet az óvilág
És e jelen kor mívei közt csudálsz.
[All is great and beautiful that you admire among the 
creations of the ancient world and the present time.]
This “all” is what he lists. However, whether there is an order of values 
among these, or, if one follows the next in chronological order – we do 
not learn anything about that. In effect, it is in the unity of battle and 
art that Berzsenyi was looking for in the parade of images. As he stood 
in the flood of the ocean with the image of the “god of the seas”, i.e. 
as he bravely faced the frenzied waves, obviously it is also Esterházy’s 
duty to do the same. However, when these waves overcome him, he is 
obliged to filter the beautiful and the great from this commotion. Power 
and art are not present here as a dichotomy but next to each other – and 
they obviously need to manifest in Esterházy. At the same time, the 
flood of the sea of images (following the analogy of the tides of the 
ocean) does not seem to be quieting, instead it flows pathetically for a 
few stanzas. This flood goes back to the situation at the beginning of 
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the poem (i.e. that the troops are gathering in the middle of a war, and 
Esterházy has to lead them).
The eighth stanza elevates the poem to the perspective of world his-
tory. Namely, in world history, it is power and art that “illuminate” – 
Athens is obviously an example of art, while Rome is rather an example 
of power; however, it is probably not too much to assume that both big 
empires were built on art and power. (Incidentally, there is another ref-
erence left on its own here – this time about Prometheus, who donated 
art to people.) The two imperial capitals appear in a positive sense here: 
the history of these cities is an example of the alignment of beauty and 
greatness, art and power.
In the following, it is from this abstract, both historical and myth-
ical perspective which in any case was far from the ongoing war, that 
the poem switches back to the specific situation of reciting the poem. 
Berzsenyi first takes a look at the situation from the European horizon 
of the French wars, followed by the Hungarian situation. The nineth 
stanza clearly shows the connections between art and power that flashed 
from a mythical perspective above; however, here the two big empires 
are already contemporary France and Great Britain:
Nézd a virágzó Gallia népeit
S Nelson hazáját, – rettegi a világ
 Ez ész s erő két nagy csudájat,
  S hirdeti napkelet és enyészet.
[Watch the peoples of thriving Gaul and Nelson’s 
homeland – the world fears these two big miracles of 
reason and power, and this is what the east/sunrise 
and the west/decay announces.]
Gaul and Nelson’s homeland are the modern-era analogues of Athens 
and Rome. Berzsenyi also attempts here to subtly refer the duality of 
art and power (the two great miracles of reason and strength) back to 
the dilemma of birth and decay. Namely “napkelet és enyészet” can also 
mean ‘from East to West’, i.e. that these two empires, which are other-
wise fighting each other, are recognized all over the world; on the other 
hand, he describes the West with the noun “enyészet”, which quite ob-
viously plays on the possibility of ‘decay’.
Three layers are posed on top of each other in the poem: the tenth 
stanza is the one to jerk the train of thought back to Hungarian reality. 
He expresses this in the form of a contrast: the nation does not obtain 
glory even though a thousand noblemen (i.e. the army led by Esterházy) 
are fighting for it. However, in light of the above, it is not clear on 
what scale this battle is taking place: the Hungarians are fighting a 
mythological battle (mentioning laurus may refer to this), fighting in 
a perspective of world history (the culture and power of Athens and 
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Rome), or are the troops gathering in the Szombathely camp trying to 
climb “the steel mountains”?
It is in this tripartite division where Esterházy appears in the elev-
enth, final stanza, and the ethical dictate of sacrificing for the homeland 
prevails in these three perspectives both at the same time and separately. 
“You, mighty prince, the gods have placed in the highest rank” – here 
is the mythological perspective; “help your flesh and blood” – here is 
the historical perspective (the history of the family obliges), as well as 
the reference to the specific situation. The topos of the “temple of fame” 
can thus be invoked here: it can unite these three dimensions, as well as 
absorb the alignment of culture and power presented by Berzsenyi. (The 
Temple of Fame has become a topos of the European literature after 
Alexander Pope, see Bennett, Chaucer’s Book of Fame.)
As we have seen, power and violence are closely linked in Berzsenyi 
(they are virtually synonyms in this poem). The other side is culture 
(what is art and reason here). However, these two spheres of existence 
do not contradict each other, instead, whoever also has a privilege in the 
other dimension of existence can keep the power to themselves. Speech 
about strength, when it takes place in a poem, necessarily uses the lan-
guage of culture, although even in this case, it allows space for power. 
Berzsenyi solves this by having a basic historical narrative (history is 
analogous with organic life), but the individual possessing power and 
culture (here: Miklós Esterházy) can place himself in the common force 
field of myth, history, and reality. Power can thus elevate the individual 
from historical necessity and make him a mythical heros.
(power and violence)
Modernity demands the minimization of violence from the future. From 
the future, because it cannot contain it in its own present (Reemtsma, 
Vertrauen und Gewalt 182–184). For Berzsenyi, it is not so much the 
legitimization of violence that is the question but its essence. He shows 
the noble-estate image of military virtues, which so frequently recurred 
in the insurrectionist patriotic poetry of the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, both in a mythological and a world history perspective. 
Possessing strength and power through virtue not only points to the in-
dividual’s epic heroism, but it also suspends the perspectives of tempo-
rality in that the historical agent (here: Miklós Esterházy) assumes the 
timelessness of virtue. This is where the stake is in Berzsenyi’s martial 
poetry: can the agent existing in time switch to an atemporal form of 
existence? The poem under analysis gives an affirmative answer to this 
question. However, the Napoleonic wars forced the poet to re-evaluate. 
In 1805, he wrote several odes in which he only sees it possible to bridge 
the temporal rift through an apocalypse that converts everything into 
the present. The fate of the nation, the essence of virtue (its possession 
or abandonment) can also stay open as a dilemma, because violence and 
25
Will to Language, Culture, and Power
power are not the privileges of the pre-modern individual anymore but 
a function of the linguistic-discursive achievement of modern societies.
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